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Abstract 
The international struggle against apartheid that emerged during the second half of the twentieth 
century made the system of legalised racial oppression in South Africa one of the world’s great moral 
causes. Looking back at the anti-apartheid struggle, a defining characteristic was the scope of the 
worldwide efforts to condemn, co-ordinate, and isolate the country. In March 1961, the international 
campaign against apartheid achieved its first major success when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd 
chose to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth following vocal protests at the Heads of 
State Summit held in London. As a consequence, it appeared albeit briefly, that external pressure 
would effectively serve as a catalyst for achieving far-reaching and immediate political change in South 
Africa. The global campaign, centred on South Africa remaining in the Commonwealth, was the first 
of its kind launched by South Africa’s national liberation movements, and signalled the beginning of 
thirty years of continued protest and lobbying. The contributions from one organisation that had a 
role in launching and co-ordinating this particular transnational campaign, the South Africa United 
Front (SAUF), an alliance of liberation groups, have been largely forgotten. Leading members of the 
SAUF claimed the organisation had a key part in South Africa’s subsequent exit from the 
Commonwealth, and the purpose of this article is to explore the validity of such assertions, as well as 
the role and impact it had in generating a groundswell of opposition to apartheid in the early 1960s. 
Although the SAUF’s demands for South Africa to leave the Commonwealth were ultimately fulfilled, 
the documentary evidence suggests that its campaigning activities and impact were not a decisive 
factor; however the long-term significance of the SAUF, and the position it had in the rise of the British 
Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) has not been fully recognised. As such, the events around the 
campaign for South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth act as a microcosm of developments 
that would define the international struggle against apartheid.      
Keywords: 
Commonwealth; apartheid; anti-apartheid; South Africa; South Africa United Front (SAUF); African 
National Congress (ANC); Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) 
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Campaigning against apartheid: The rise, fall and legacies of the South Africa United Front 1960-
1962 
‘Largely through our efforts South Africa had to withdraw from the Commonwealth’1 
 Yusuf Dadoo, South Africa United Front (SAUF) 
The international struggle against apartheid that emerged during the second half of the twentieth 
century made the system of legalised racial oppression in South Africa one of the world’s great moral 
causes.2 Looking back at the anti-apartheid struggle, a defining characteristic was the scope of the 
worldwide efforts to condemn, co-ordinate, and isolate the ruling white-minority National Party (NP) 
government. In March 1961, the international campaign against apartheid achieved its first major 
success when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd chose to withdraw South Africa from the 
Commonwealth following vocal protests at the Heads of State Summit held in London. As a 
consequence, it appeared albeit briefly, that external pressure would effectively serve as a catalyst for 
achieving far-reaching and immediate political change in South Africa. However, such aspirations were 
short-lived, dashed by a combination of intransigence and repression by the NP government, and 
appeasement by major western powers. The outcome was the continuation of white minority rule and 
the emergence of a protracted struggle against apartheid by domestic and transnational movements.  
In the long and multi-layered history of the struggle against white minority rule, the 
internationalisation of opposition to apartheid became one of the core strategies utilised by South 
Africa’s liberation movements in the fight for freedom.3 There was a belief that concerted 
international action, such as boycotts and protests, would accelerate the overthrow of apartheid.4 
International solidarity and protest against apartheid-rule had developed throughout the 1950s in 
Britain, facilitated by organisations such as the Africa Bureau, the Movement for Colonial Freedom 
(MCF), and Christian Action, which were aided by a network of South African exiles including Tennyson 
Makiwane and Vella Pillay. By the late 1950s, these groups had initiated publicity campaigns to raise 
public awareness of apartheid including mass rallies and boycotts.5 However, the first major campaign 
(1960-61) launched by the exiled liberation movements, in conjunction with British anti-apartheid 
groups, focused on South Africa’s application to remain in the Commonwealth, which initiated thirty 
years of continued protest and lobbying. The contributions from one organisation that had a role in 
coordinating this transnational campaign, the South Africa United Front (SAUF) have largely been 
forgotten in the wider narratives; yet if Dr Yusuf Dadoo, a leading representative of the SAUF is to be 
believed, the organisation played a pivotal role in securing South Africa’s exit from the 
Commonwealth. The SAUF is briefly discussed in an array of academic works, but has not attracted 
the full attention of studies addressing this period.6 Established in June 1960, the SAUF was an alliance 
of Southern African national liberation movements, comprising the African National Congress (ANC), 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and the South West Africa 
National Union (SWANU), with the stated purpose of: overthrowing white domination and the 
creation of a democratic state based on universal adult suffrage.7 Working in tandem with the nascent 
British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), the most high profile campaign that the SAUF waged was to 
have South Africa’s excluded from the Commonwealth.  
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This article will explore Dadoo’s claim by assessing the role and impact that the SAUF had in generating 
a groundswell of international opposition to apartheid in the early 1960s. The SAUF’s demands for 
South Africa to be excluded from the Commonwealth were ultimately fulfilled, but the evidence 
indicates that Dadoo’s assertions are overstated as its campaign activities and influence were 
negligible; in reality the apartheid state exited of its own volition.8 However, in the early 1960s, the 
SAUF was an important cog within the evolution of the AAM, providing the organisation with 
legitimacy and support for its activities that sought to increase British public awareness of apartheid. 
Moreover, the rise and fall of the SAUF provided a mechanism for the ANC to secure its position as 
South Africa’s preeminent liberation movement within British anti-apartheid circles, to the detriment 
of the PAC. The SAUF therefore provides a microcosm of the developments that would come to later 
characterise the international struggle against apartheid.     
Establishing the SAUF 
In March 1960, the brutality of the apartheid state vividly caught the attention of the international 
community following the police massacre of 69 protesters at Sharpeville. Even the United Nations 
Security Council, not usually known for its condemnation of South Africa, moved quickly to censure 
the government, calling for an immediate end to apartheid.9 Around the world, the Sharpeville 
Massacre drew public and political denunciation and increasingly put South Africa’s racial 
discrimination under the spotlight. Domestically, the dynamics of black political opposition were 
irrevocably altered by the massacre. In the immediate aftermath, protest marches and violent clashes 
erupted across South Africa, which briefly challenged the hegemony of the apartheid order.10 
However, it was short-lived. The NP responded ruthlessly by declaring a state of emergency on 30 
March, arresting thousands of people including many prominent political leaders, and swiftly banned 
all African opposition movements including the ANC and PAC. The impact on both liberation 
movements was far-reaching. Facing harassment from South Africa’s security forces and with political 
leaders either in prison or in hiding, the NP had drastically inhibited the ability to organise, co-ordinate 
and escalate political protests against white minority rule. Ultimately, Sharpeville was a defining 
moment for the liberation movements, sparking an enforced re-evaluation of their tactics and 
strategies. Furthermore, the inability to operate legally in South Africa pushed the movements into 
indefinite exile, scattering their supporters across the world.  
Before the events at Sharpeville, both the ANC and PAC had planned to create external missions, so 
that domestic activity could be augmented by international solidarity and action. In December 1959, 
the ANC had discussed creating an international mission, which would ‘carry abroad the message of 
its vision and solicit support for the movement’.11 The role of establishing an External Mission fell to 
the ANC’s Deputy President Oliver Tambo, who had been nominated by the leadership to co-ordinate 
the movement’s international efforts. However, out of necessity, these plans were rapidly accelerated 
in the aftermath of Sharpeville. Tambo secretly left the country in April 1960, first making his way to 
the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), and then on to Tanganyika (now Tanzania). 
Likewise, the PAC had also recognised the importance of garnering international support for their 
cause, and had nominated Peter Molotsi and Nana Mahomo to represent the movement abroad.12 On 
the eve of the Sharpeville Massacre, they had both left South Africa for Tanganyika, which in the early 
1960s, served as a secure base for many exiled African liberation movements.13 Yusuf Dadoo, another 
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key activist in the SAUF, representing both the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the SAIC, 
had exited South Africa in a similar fashion; his remit decided upon by ‘the SACP in consultation with 
the SAIC… [was] that Dadoo should go abroad to give the Party an external presence and to help in 
organising all-round international support for the internal struggle’.14 As a result, all of the main South 
African liberation movements had some representation abroad by April 1960. Although the liberation 
movements had envisaged a relatively short period in exile, little did they realise that this small band 
of exiles would establish the foundations of their respective struggles against the apartheid state.   
An important question to consider is why the different liberation movements sought to create an 
alliance in exile against apartheid? For the ANC and SAIC, an alliance was a ‘natural’ decision.15 The 
two movements were already part of what was known as the Congress Alliance within South Africa, 
an anti-apartheid coalition that had emerged during the 1950s, and whose members had played 
important roles in the writing of the Freedom Charter in 1955. Once in exile, maintaining this alliance 
was an obvious decision. Moreover, in the light of Pretoria’s on-going occupation of Namibia, SWANU, 
and later the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in January 1961, were included into 
the United Front.16 In fact, mirroring events at Sharpeville, only three months previously in December 
1959, South African policemen had shot dead eleven protestors at the Old Location in Windhoek.17 
The incident demonstrated the parallels between the repression of African political opposition and 
state brutality in the two countries, and the need for urgent political action to combat it.18  
However, the inclusion of the PAC was far less obvious. It must be remembered that before the 
Sharpeville Massacre the ANC and PAC were fierce political rivals; indeed the PAC was formed as a 
splinter group in 1959 by disaffected members of the ANC, who believed that ‘Africanist’ ideals had 
been subsumed by communist sympathies. Furthermore, the protest at Sharpeville on the 21 March 
1960, was organised by the PAC, designed in part to usurp the ANC’s own planned demonstration later 
in the month. Political tension and mutual suspicion between the two movements was apparent from 
the outset.  
Nevertheless, there are several explanations as to why the PAC would want to be part of the United 
Front, and why its rivals might entertain the possibility of a partnership. First and foremost, all the 
exiled liberation movements were facing a parlous state of affairs, particularly financially. After 
Sharpeville, a pressing concern for each of the movements was to secure allies that could offer safe 
refugee and political solidarity. Although the organisations had begun planning for a life in exile, they 
were in no way adequately prepared for it prior to being banned. Consequently, all the movements 
had little or no structures or resources in exile with which to receive those who had escaped South 
Africa. By working together, the formation of the SAUF provided an opportunity for the movements 
to jointly fundraise, and combine what few resources were available to them.19 Secondly, it allowed 
them to campaign on a joint platform. Despite the animosity between the organisations, they were 
ultimately all striving towards the shared goal of overthrowing apartheid.20 The result was that the 
liberation movements could campaign with ‘one voice’, and utilise their scarce resources to isolate 
South Africa internationally. Thirdly, the exiled members actually got on with each other personally, 
and according to Tambo, individual relations ‘continue[d] to be more friendly… and by no means 
bitter’.21 There was a realisation that despite their ideological differences, working with one another 
was beneficial for their respective struggles. Tambo recalled that immediately after going into exile he 
met Mahamo and Molotsi briefly in Dar-es-Salaam, who advocated that ‘we shall have to work 
together’ to represent ‘the interests of the South African people abroad’.22 Furthermore, interviews 
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with PAC activists conducted by Kwandiwe Kondlo reinforce this point, as they valued ‘the tactical 
benefits that could accrue from the initiative’ in light of the precariousness of the movement’s 
international position.23 However, the perceived ‘tactical benefits’ of unity was not one that was 
shared by the majority of the ANC or PAC leadership. As will be discussed later on, internal ideological 
divisions within both movements, and divergent strategic aims of the external missions in comparison 
to those that had remained within South Africa meant that external unity between the ANC and PAC 
was an anathema for many activists.24 An ANC report from October 1961, reiterated this point by 
arguing that ‘the differences between the organisations in S.A. … made unity abroad impossible’.25  
The final explanation that has been mooted for the formation of the SAUF is that it was encouraged 
by external pressure from the Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah. In the limited literature on the 
SAUF this is a debated point, but the consensus is that Nkrumah played a decisive role in facilitating 
the coalition.26 Tambo recalled that various leaders, including himself, Molotsi and Mahomo were 
invited to Ghana, the purpose of which ‘was to put to us the idea of, inter alia, (a) a United Front, (b) 
establishing the Headquarters of such a Front in Accra, and (c) issuing a public statement … the 
principle of forming a united front on some basis was readily agreed to’.27 However, such a decisive 
role for Nkrumah seems incongruous, especially given that there was considerable antipathy towards 
the members of Congress Alliance (and their perceived communist sympathies) amongst many African 
states.28 Furthermore, Nkrumah was the leading light of pan-Africanism which would have made him 
predisposed towards supporting the interests of the PAC, and therefore highly unlikely to have 
demanded the inclusion of the ANC. Finally, Nkrumah’s political stance before and during the 
Commonwealth discussions in March 1961 would serve to undermine any notion of him being a 
leading figure behind the creation of the SAUF.29 During the Heads of State negotiations, the Ghanaian 
president initially adopted a conciliatory approach towards the apartheid state, and despite some 
rhetorical posturing, remained unwilling to lead an Afro-Asian motion against the expulsion of South 
Africa – a core goal of the SAUF.30 Nkrumah’s lack of decisive action is hardly representative of 
someone who has been accorded such a prime position in influencing the formation of the United 
Front.       
Following several months of negotiations and planning, the liberation movements met in Addis Ababa 
in June 1960 at the Second Conference of Independent African States, to establish the SAUF. At the 
conference, the representatives of the liberation movements formalised their aims, discussed a future 
programme of action, and created the administrative structures for the organisation.31 The 
representatives – Oliver Tambo, Tennyson Makiwane, (ANC); Nana Mahomo, Peter Molotsi, and 
Vusumzi Make (PAC); Yusuf Dadoo (SAIC); Jariretundu Kozonguizi (SWANU); Mburumba Kerina 
(independent/SWAPO) – agreed that the SAUF, operating initially out of offices in Accra, Cairo, and 
London (and later New York), would seek to mobilise international opinion and action against South 
Africa, in order to overthrow apartheid and implement democracy.32 Furthermore, there was a clear 
emphasis ‘that there was no “leader” of the United Front’ because of the strained relationships 
between the movements domestically, and ‘it was expressly agreed that no member of the United 
Front would indulge in attacking, misrepresenting or undermining’ each other.33  
The conference proved a useful strategic starting point for the SAUF, as its aims and objectives were 
discussed and ratified by delegates from across the African continent. One of the main conference 
resolutions cemented this continental support by publicly denouncing apartheid, and there was even 
a clause that explicitly criticised South Africa’s continued status within the Commonwealth.34 The 
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resolution meant that within days of forming, the SAUF had already identified a programme of 
international mobilisation against apartheid, designed to complement the movements’ domestic 
resistance activities.      
Activism and political engagement 
Very quickly, the London office became the epicentre of activism for the SAUF from which the majority 
of its campaign efforts emanated, due to the significant number of solidarity organisations present in 
Britain. As demonstrated in a range of studies examining anti-apartheid activism by Håkan Thörn, 
Christabel Gurney, Rob Skinner, and Simon Stevens, Britain had attracted a small, yet politically active 
number of exiled South Africans during the 1950s, whose efforts were aided by a range of anti-
apartheid organisations such as the Africa Bureau, Committee of African Organisations (CAO), and the 
Boycott Movement that were publicising the plight of the black majority.35 Individuals affiliated with 
the Congress Alliance, and the ANC in particular, including Makiwane, Pillay, and Abdul Minty played 
an important role in forging links with these various groups to promote the South African cause in 
Britain.36 For example, the establishment of the Boycott Movement in 1959 (which Makiwane was 
active in) was in part inspired by ANC President Chief Luthuli’s request for an international boycott of 
South African products; London activists who had been protesting against colonialism throughout the 
decade heeded this call.37 The SAUF was therefore able to build upon these multidimensional anti-
apartheid activities and personal networks that had developed in Britain during the 1950s, which 
provided it with a receptive platform to work from.   
The short history of the SAUF is one closely interlinked with the emergence of the nascent AAM, and 
it is from their joint programmes of action that momentum gathered to mobilise public opinion. From 
the very beginning of the AAM’s existence, formally established in the aftermath of Sharpeville in April 
1960, there had been a South African contingent included in its national committee; Makiwane was 
made its director, and Dadoo regularly attended meetings. The result was that the AAM ‘national 
committee then, and later reflected the new influx of South African refuges’.38 The close connections 
were clearly demonstrated in August 1960, soon after the SAUF’s creation, when the organisation was 
invited to have a representative on the AAM’s Executive Committee. The offer was officially rejected 
by the SAUF, preferring to remain an independent entity, and opted instead for observer status.39 
However, the decision did not change the relationship that much. In reality the two organisations 
officially shared very similar aims and worked closely together, to the extent their programmes were 
described as ‘indistinguishable’ from one another.40 Indeed, the blurring of the official lines between 
the two organisations, resulted in the SAUF having to clarify its position vis-à-vis the AAM. On 4 
November 1960, in a meeting between the PAC’s Mahomo and five members of the AAM Executive 
Committee, he insisted that the SAUF ‘must be regarded as finally responsible for the international 
campaign’. The AAM demurred. The Executive Committee responded that it had been formed solely 
to develop British support for the policies of the liberation movements, and because the SAUF were 
representative of the South African people, the AAM’s own ‘broad policy would naturally be bound 
up with the stand taken by the United Front’.41 This was an important early admission by the AAM of 
how closely connected it was to the SAUF and its objectives. However, a crucial problem that negated 
the SAUF’s ‘official’ policy of autonomy from the AAM, was the actions of Makiwane and Dadoo, ANC 
and SAIC activists respectively, who remained extremely influential within its leadership structures. 
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Such a conflict of interest did little to foster feelings of unity within the SAUF, and justifiably fuelled 
PAC suspicions of the ANC’s motivations and intentions.    
In September 1960, the SAUF officially announced its first programme of action with the core 
emphasis on the international isolation of South Africa, and the mobilisation of public and political 
opposition against apartheid. The programme of action advocated: international efforts to secure 
support of all UN member states to implement immediate and effective sanctions; an oil embargo 
against South Africa; a proposal that independent African nations should refuse air and shipping 
facilities to South African vessels and planes; and a consumer boycott.42 The SAUF’s press statement 
set out a number of initiatives to facilitate these over-arching aims, which included: the lobbying of 
the British government; active support of the AAM’s Penny Pledge Campaign that sought to raise funds 
and awareness; to hold a mass rally with five British anti-apartheid groups; for Tambo, Mahamo, and 
Dadoo to attend the TUC Annual Conference; and to conduct a publicity tour of major British cities, 
organised by the AAM, to spread the message of the SAUF to the general public.43  
The key problem that the SAUF faced was generating interest for their cause. Despite the 
condemnation and outrage over Sharpeville, the British public were seemingly disinterested in turning 
out for events. It would be fair to say that the SAUF struggled to have much of an impact on the 
political consciousness, particularly outside of London. For example, the publicity tour around Britain, 
struggled to attract many people, which was a major disappointment for the SAUF and AAM.44 It did 
not help that the British media were equally unreceptive to what the SAUF had to say. In November 
1960, a press conference was held to draw attention to the Pondo Revolt, which the SAUF explicitly 
linked to wider political and socio-economic problems across South Africa.45 However, attendance was 
very poor, and the press were accused of giving ‘scant attention’ to the issue and looking ‘for 
something more sensational’ than the events in Pondoland. Tellingly, a report of the press conference 
indicated that the core aim had been ‘to revive interest in the S.A. question’, a tacit admission that 
the SAUF’s anti-apartheid message was not getting through.46 
It is easy to be critical of these initial difficulties, but it must be kept in mind the considerable 
challenges that the SAUF encountered in the first six months of its existence. Primarily, the individual 
liberation movements had been totally ill-equipped for exile and lacked the necessary resources to 
plan or wage comprehensive actions. Furthermore, there were only seven people who actually 
constituted the SAUF (an eighth if the independent observer, Kerina is taken into account) who were 
spread over several cities, on different continents. Moreover, it was always going to be difficult for a 
new organisation, albeit supported by existing anti-apartheid groups, to galvanise public opinion. The 
history of the ANC is a case in point, as its support and influence during the liberation struggle 
experienced enormous fluctuations.47 The SAUF required a hook to capture the public and political 
imagination, which fortunately came in the form of South Africa’s enforced application to renew its 
membership within the Commonwealth.   
The Commonwealth question 
In May 1960, shortly after Sharpeville, the ‘South African question’ had arisen during the Meeting of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The increasingly controversial issue of South Africa’s membership 
was discussed in an ‘acrimonious debate on apartheid’, in which Malaya was ‘strongly critical’.48 As 
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the ‘wind of change’ saw Britain grant independence to a number of its colonies, these new nations 
joined the Commonwealth, leaving the system of apartheid as an anathema to the increasingly 
multiracial composition of the organisation. The situation was complicated further, when on 5 
October, South Africa held a ‘white’s only’ referendum on whether the country should become a 
Republic, in which the electorate narrowly voted in favour.49 As a consequence, Prime Minister 
Hendrik Verwoerd was required to reapply for continued membership of the Commonwealth at the 
next Heads of State Meeting in March 1961.  
The SAUF immediately seized upon this campaign opportunity to mobilise international support, 
implementing a programme of action focusing on the ‘exclusion of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth’.50 In a television interview Mohomo asserted that the SAUF was embarking on the 
‘first systematic approach, the first time we’ve attempted to direct our appeal to the international 
community’, in order to coalesce ‘world opinion directed against South Africa’.51 To generate 
increased awareness of the SAUF’s demands, Tambo and Make travelled to New York to advise the 
Afro-Asian committee at the UN on the situation in South Africa, and while in the city, they also 
publicly condemned the referendum result outright.52 However, the main task of the programme of 
action was to convince ‘other members of the Commonwealth that SA should be excluded from it’.53  
In order to achieve its stated aims, the SAUF adopted a two pronged approach. The first was to get 
the Accra office to speak with ‘the President of Ghana and the Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria with 
the view to getting a categorical declaration from them that they will press for the expulsion of South 
Africa from the Commonwealth’.54 The second was to send Dadoo, Make, and Makiwane on a tour of 
India, Ceylon, Malaya, and Pakistan in February 1961, in order to lobby political parties and 
governments into taking a definitive stand against apartheid.55 For example, during the tour of India 
the group were the guests of the semi-official Indian Council for Africa, at which they addressed 
several meetings, and were scheduled to have discussions with Jawaharlal Nehru.56 Meanwhile in 
Britain, with the assistance of the AAM, the SAUF sought to engage, educate, and rally public opinion 
against South Africa’s continued membership, through lobbying politicians, talking to the media, and 
holding protest rallies. The SAUF successfully persuaded the National Executive Committee of the 
Labour Party in January 1961, to explicitly demand that South Africa should be suspended, and also 
initiated a Cambridge University petition which gained 1,000 signatures, ‘in accordance with the views 
of the South African United Front’ which was handed to Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Rahman.57 
These activities certainly generated greater public awareness about apartheid, which the Heads of 
State were obliged to take account of, but they were far from powerful; the Commonwealth leaders 
either ignored these demands or remained non-committal as to their course of action.  
Dadoo’s grand claims about the SAUF’s decisive role in the exit of South Africa are questionable when 
the degree of influence they were able to wield over the process appears negligible. Without retracing 
well-worn ground, studies including those by Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, Richard Wood, and 
Saul Dubow have all addressed the intricacies and intrigue of South Africa’s decision to depart from 
the Commonwealth.58 What is abundantly clear from the archives is that in the months following 
South Africa’s decision to become a Republic, the British government and the Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan expended much time and energy to ensure that it remained part of the Commonwealth, 
and to convince other leaders of the merits of this position, despite their abhorrence of the apartheid 
system.59 The odds were therefore heavily stacked against the SAUF in its efforts to persuade the 
Commonwealth leaders of the need to expel South Africa. For the SAUF, there was already an 
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apparent sense of doubt about the possibilities of success even before its representatives embarked 
upon an international lobbying tour, because ‘politicians easily avoided making pledges or decisions’.60 
Much to their chagrin, the SAUF soon discovered that the Afro-Asian bloc, which would have seemed 
‘naturally’ predisposed to opposing South Africa’s readmission, were reticent to commit to any specific 
action.61 For example, the Indian, Ghanaian, and Nigerian governments were lobbied hard by SAUF 
representatives before the conference, but had all refused to be drawn into making definitive 
statements, choosing to adopt a cautious approach to the discussions, and to wait for other prime 
ministers to ‘take the lead in excluding South Africa’.62 There was a mood of such ‘deep pessimism’ 
amongst the South African exiles about this eventuality that five members of the SAUF had 
desperately sought last-minute interviews with nine of the prime ministers to convince them 
otherwise.63 A successful lobbying campaign would clearly not have been resorting to such measures 
so late in the day, and indicates the lack of influence they were able to wield over the process.  
The initial signs at the Commonwealth conference in March were not positive for the SAUF’s 
campaign. Macmillan had spent much of the conference seeking to negotiate a compromise and to 
find a solution to the ‘South African question’; he was very nearly successful, in that all the Heads of 
State agreed that on a purely constitutional basis, there was an overwhelming case for South Africa to 
remain within the Commonwealth. However, during the course of the discussions, the tone of the 
debate changed. Over a series of sessions, vocal opposition to apartheid’s racial policies steadily 
mounted amongst the delegates, with a number of leaders publicly distancing themselves from South 
Africa’s readmission.64 Beyond the conference hall, a widely publicised article penned by Julius 
Nyerere added further fuel to the debate, by asserting that apartheid made a mockery of the inter-
racial composition of the Commonwealth, and summarised his position succinctly by declaring ‘that 
to vote South Africa in, is to vote us out’.65 Sensing the tide of opinion was against him, and refusing 
to accept any compromises or external criticisms of apartheid, Verwoerd chose instead to withdraw 
South Africa’s application voluntarily.66 
No matter how South Africa’s exit occurred, the announcement by Verwoerd was a major propaganda 
coup for the SAUF and the AAM. A statement proclaimed that:  
the enforced withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth is a resounding 
victory for our people, and marks an historic step forward in our struggle against 
apartheid… This is a stunning defeat for Verwoerd and a dismal failure for 
Macmillan… The world is solidly against Verwoerd's racial policies.67 
In an article for Fighting Talk, the influence of the SAUF was claimed to have been ‘a spectre at the 
Premier’s Conference; it was this spectre that Verwoerd fought for the allegiances of the 
Commonwealth’s premiers. The spectre was the South African United Front, Messers Oliver Tambo, 
and Yusuf M. Dadoo… [and] the premiers stood with the United Front against Verwoerd’.68 The Anti-
Apartheid Bulletin described the actions as ‘probably the greatest victory yet in the international 
campaign against apartheid. South Africa was forced out of the commonwealth’.69 Another article 
triumphantly asserted that ‘a great part of the credit for the victory must go to the United Front’.70 
The perceived international importance of the event was repeatedly emphasised, and reinforced in a 
SAUF statement celebrating it as ‘a significant victory for all opponents of Dr Verwoerd’s racial policies. 
It marks the point beyond which the world will not sit idly looking on while South Africa continues 
practising inhuman policies… this heralds the beginning of a rapid world movement towards the 
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complete isolation of South Africa’.71 South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth had 
validated the SAUF’s campaign, and provided a much needed boost towards fulfilling its core strategy 
of mobilising international action against South Africa. 
Indeed, for the SAUF, the opportunity to press home the advantage and further isolate South Africa 
looked within its grasp. The sense of optimism within the SAUF was accentuated by UN Resolution 
1598 (XV) in April 1961, which described apartheid ‘as reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity’ 
and requested member states to take individual and collective action to bring about the end of the 
racial policies.72 The UN Assembly adopted this resolution almost unanimously, with only one 
abstention; even Britain which had previously voted against every resolution on apartheid, voted in 
favour.73 The sum of these parts meant that internationally at least, South Africa appeared to be on 
the ropes. Further activity in May, in close conjunction with the AAM, saw a mass rally held in London 
and a delegation of SAUF representatives delivering notes and telegrams of protest from across the 
world to South Africa House.74 For a short period of time it seemed that international condemnation 
and pressure might be the catalyst for political and social change in South Africa.  
However, the SAUF’s triumphs were fleeting. Shortly afterwards, the basis of the United Front began 
to crumble as the tentative unity between the ANC and PAC collapsed under the weight of ‘malicious 
distortion and lies’.75 Even as the SAUF was publicly celebrating South Africa’s withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth in print, the reality saw the campaign efforts stalling, and the cracks between the ANC 
and PAC’s domestic and external leaders simply widening. The ever-growing divisions led Tom Lodge 
to observe that ‘neither the PAC or the ANC had a particularly sincere concern for unity, at least not if 
this required making concessions to the other’.76 The disinclination towards unity had serious 
ramifications for the SAUF. As a consequence very little activity was conducted in the name of the 
SAUF from April 1961 onwards, and by October 1961, it was reported that it was ‘no longer in 
existence except in name’.77 Finally, in March 1962, the SAUF representatives met in London, and 
agreed to dissolve the organisation by the 15 March, bringing an end to the coalition.78       
 Significance and legacies of the SAUF 
The creation of the SAUF in 1960, and its short-lived campaign efforts, ensured the coalition, had 
according to Tambo ‘a full, vigorous and serviceable life … [that] advanced the cause of African people 
in South Africa’.79 The difficulties this small group of exiled representatives of the various liberation 
movements faced were challenging, yet they managed to overcome some of the initial obstacles. By 
working together, the exiled individuals demonstrated that ideological rivalries could be subsumed in 
favour of co-operation. In doing so, the SAUF mounted a series of campaigns in Britain that helped 
raise public awareness and generate a semblance of active international opposition to apartheid. 
However, the successes assigned to it do not ring true. The SAUF’s most high-profile ‘success’ 
concerning South Africa and the Commonwealth holds very little merit under close scrutiny. While it 
would clearly be wrong to dismiss out-right the SAUF’s contributions in helping to create a public 
groundswell of anti-apartheid opposition, the evidence demonstrates that it did not have a major role 
in influencing the Commonwealth Heads of State’s, or ultimately Verwoerd’s decision to withdraw. 
Indeed, Hyam emphasised that ‘Verwoerd had more than sufficient reasons of his own for not 
particularly wanting to remain a member any longer’.80 Therefore the ‘success’ of South Africa 
withdrawing from the Commonwealth can hardly be accredited to the SAUF.  
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In fact, South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth did not have the desired long-term impact. 
For South Africa, exiting the Commonwealth was certainly not portrayed as a defeat. On returning 
from the conference, Verwoerd was given an ‘uproarious, hero’s welcome’ by a crowd of 15-20,000 
people, to whom he sold the departure as a victory for the republic, while insisting that now the 
‘friendship with Britain [was] firmer’.81 The broader reaction amongst whites in South Africa therefore 
tells its own story. After 1961, the system of apartheid was strengthened domestically, and 
internationally western nations continued to support South Africa for much of the next thirty years.82 
Verwoerd had gambled correctly that withdrawing from the Commonwealth would not affect South 
Africa’s links with Britain.83 For example, almost immediately after the Heads of State conference, the 
British government was devising ways of maintaining its links; cabinet papers indicate that ‘it was 
agreed that we should seek to maintain friendly relations on a bilateral basis with South Africa’, 
although some caution should be exercised, in order ‘to avoid giving the impression that after her 
withdrawal South Africa was to remain a member of the Commonwealth in all but name’.84 South 
Africa’s exit did very little to change the political situation for the oppressed majority. Britain and other 
western states sought to maintain the status quo, irrespective of protests by anti-apartheid opposition 
movements such as the SAUF.     
For the liberation movements within the SAUF, this brief period of external unity was a minor 
aberration in what turned out to be a long and bitter rivalry. Clearly, for the small group of exiled 
South African’s representing the ANC, PAC, and SAIC, co-operation was theoretically far more 
beneficial than tension and rivalry. However, a key problem for the SAUF was that it was created by 
these seven exiled individuals, and did not have the wider-support of their respective movements 
within South Africa. To label the SAUF as ‘representative’ of the ANC or PAC would be something of a 
misnomer. Tambo later recalled that the SAUF suffered because ‘it was not established as a projection 
of a set-up which [was] obtained in South Africa, and was therefore not a deliberate creation of the 
organisations within South Africa’.85 While unity may have prevailed albeit temporarily, the inherent 
rivalries proved insurmountable, and the opinions of the PAC’s and ANC’s leaders quashed any 
reconciliation abroad. ANC grandee Walter Sisulu had been astonished that the exiled leaders had 
even agreed to co-operate, because how could unity ‘be achieved abroad, when there was no unity 
at home’?86 Likewise, the PAC’s fragmented domestic and external leadership could not agree upon 
its own unified position concerning international co-operation, which in turn, meant that outwith of 
South Africa, ‘disagreements about the United Front helped engender the first round of the corrosive 
infighting that would characterize the PAC’s history in exile’.87 These rivalries and suspicions 
undermined the effectiveness of the SAUF throughout its short existence.  
Perhaps most serious to the long-term prospects of the United Front had been the divergent 
ideological positions of the liberation movements. The so-called ‘racialist’ positons of the PAC or the 
ANC’s ‘communist inspired’ agenda ensured that there was an obvious clash over the SAUF’s direction 
and strategy. The suspicions borne out of the ANC-PAC split in 1959 spilled over into exile, and even if 
the seven individuals of the SAUF respected one another on a personal level as Tambo had previously 
claimed, the political relationship was not always warm.88 Furthermore, individuals associated with 
the Congress Alliance held positions of influence in multiple anti-apartheid organisations, and as a 
result the ‘official’ aims of the United Front became closely associated with those of the ANC; this did 
little to win the trust of the PAC representatives. In turn, each liberation movement increasingly 
worked towards securing their own specific agendas, rather than those of the SAUF as a whole. A 
political report had identified that the ‘differences of opinion between the ANC and the PAC are 
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supposed to be forgotten in the United Front outside South Africa, but in fact each group is on the 
look-out for possible advantages for itself’.89 For example, the Cairo office of the United Front, 
controlled entirely by PAC representatives had adopted ‘a far more militant policy than has been 
agreed by the United Front as a whole, and this has caused considerable friction within the 
movement’.90 Ultimately, the ANC placed fault squarely with the PAC for the SAUF’s demise, asserting 
that there was ‘no unity whatsoever’, and accused them of constantly undermining the project in 
favour of their own narrow interests.91 Such accusations were clearly an attempt by the ANC to 
apportion blame solely upon the PAC for the Front’s collapse. Yet, the PAC were equally damning of 
the ANC, accusing it of seeking to dominate the SAUF agenda for its own purposes, which threatened 
its own independence: the ‘PAC had no choice but to walk out of the Front because it was being 
swallowed by the ANC’.92  
The SAUF coalition and subsequent break-up set the tone for ANC-PAC relations for the duration of 
the exiled period, with the rivalries persisting as each movement sought external support and 
alliances, while simultaneously discrediting the other. Moreover, the experience and outcomes from 
this short-lived experiment made future attempts at unity impossible and hardened the mutual 
distrust; on several occasions the Organisation of African Unity tried to impose union on the two 
movements, but the ANC rejected such suggestions out-right.93  
Following the dissolution of the SAUF, the AAM retained links with the liberation movements, but was 
according to Genevieve Klein far from neutral in its approach by promoting ‘the ANC over other 
liberation movements as the most representative… and as the legitimate leader of the struggle against 
apartheid’.94 The early personal links that representatives such as Makiwane had forged with anti-
apartheid activists in the 1950s, that had been maintained through his activities within the SAUF and 
AAM structures, meant that the ANC became the main beneficiaries of such international solidarity 
after 1961. Elizabeth Williams argues that the AAM’s bias in favour of the ANC was ‘inbuilt from the 
start’, which according to Gurney meant that the organisation’s ‘first loyalty was to the ANC’, 
becoming its cheerleader throughout the struggle.95 Exemplifying the strength of these relations after 
the United Front had dissolved, the ANC representatives retained observer status on the National 
Committee. The AAM was wary of associating itself too closely with the ANC, but it was clear that they 
were its South African liberation movement of choice.96 Although the PAC was treated cordially by the 
AAM, there was in reality very little interaction with its representatives after 1962. In fact, the PAC 
was never able to fully ingratiate itself with the AAM; Lodge has characterised the AAM-PAC 
relationship as ‘mutually disdainful’, and Fieldhouse believed the PAC’s ‘Africanism was repugnant’ to 
the British officials.97 The PAC had already felt they were being side-lined within the SAUF, and this 
continued after its collapse, with the ANC dominating the agenda in Britain. However, the PAC were 
far more successful in cultivating links with independent African states in the early to mid-1960s, and 
were able to persuade many governments that the ANC was communist-inspired and controlled by 
whites.98 Therefore in a period where the very survival of the ANC was at stake, the support of 
international solidarity partners in Britain such as the AAM was not only crucial in sustaining the 
movement, but also in combating perceptions and suspicions of it around the world. For the duration 
of the ANC’s exile, the AAM was enormously beneficial and proved to be an enduring international 
ally, and one that helped galvanise public and moral protests in Britain. The SAUF institutionalised the 
existing anti-apartheid activities in Britain, and ensured the ANC became the partner of choice. 
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The AAM undoubtedly benefited from its alliance with the SAUF, and through its participation in the 
Commonwealth campaign of 1961, helped to cement its own anti-apartheid credentials. When 
considering the AAM, it is easy to take a historically determinist perspective, and simply see it in terms 
of the broad-based, popular movement it became by the 1980s. However, during the first few years 
of the AAM’s existence, the organisation was weak, financially unstable, and lacking in wider public 
appeal.99 It must be noted that the AAM emerged out of a plethora of anti-apartheid groups in Britain 
such as the MCF and CAO, and there were some serious tensions over leadership, funding, and 
coordination of activities.100 At play were suspicions, personal jealousies, and various factions 
regarding the overarching control of activities and ideological orientation of the campaigns which 
lasted throughout much of 1960.101 Perhaps indicative of the AAM’s tenuous position in anti-apartheid 
circles was that following South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth it had seriously 
considered disbanding and leaving the struggle to other groups. However, the AAM National 
Committee decided to continue so it could ‘respond to appeals for action through the S.A. United 
Front and the solidarity which had been created should not be broken’.102 This statement clearly 
demonstrates the close connections between the SAUF and the AAM, and more importantly, that the 
justification for its ongoing existence in May 1961, was premised largely on its relationship with the 
United Front.  
Any self-respecting British anti-apartheid group required the involvement of South African exiles, 
representative of the domestic struggle, to validate their cause; by successfully allying with the SAUF, 
the AAM had links to all of the main liberation movements. A key aim of the AAM had been to forge 
and nurture networks with the incoming exiles to London, and both Skinner and Williams observe that 
these individuals changed the nature of the organisation, aiding first its survival, and then its rise to 
prominence.103 Moreover, it has been argued that such relationships with the exiles became a ‘key 
component of the movement’s identity – an identity centred upon identification itself’.104 The joint 
activities with the SAUF consequently assisted the nascent AAM’s own development in the period 
1960-1961 (before the Front essentially stopped functioning in October), through valuable campaign 
and lobbying experiences that ensured it held a modicum of influence in public life. In the initial stages 
of the AAM’s life, the association with the SAUF proved extremely beneficial to the organisations 
standing by strengthening and legitimising its position as the coordinator of anti-apartheid activities 
in Britain. 
Conclusion 
The article has sought to provide a more detailed picture into the activities and legacies of the SAUF 
than has previously been afforded. Was the SAUF a success? On face value, not especially. The 
successes that have been accredited to the SAUF, such as its role in South Africa’s withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth are tenuous. It would be wrong to assert that the SAUF had no impact, because 
there certainly were instances in early 1961, when the anti-apartheid message became embedded in 
the British public consciousness. The SAUF, working closely with the AAM, were without doubt 
important in helping to mobilise this opposition. Furthermore, the SAUF’s core objective of securing 
South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth was achieved; a major propaganda coup for the anti-
apartheid struggle, the significance of which should not be discounted. Yet, quite clearly, the SAUF 
had very little to do with this and South Africa’s exit cannot be attributed to its efforts, despite its own 
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representatives, sympathetic journals, and latterly, some academics claiming otherwise. This ‘victory’ 
for the SAUF was just one example of the rewriting of the broader liberation narrative, when any 
action that was deemed to have advanced the struggle was merited to those fighting against it, 
irrespective of the reality.105 To make matters worse, South Africa’s withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth had relatively little effect on the anti-apartheid struggle at home or abroad.  
The real significance of the SAUF is frequently not recognised. The legacy of the organisation does not 
concern issues surrounding the Commonwealth, but rather as a stepping stone in strengthening the 
mutually beneficial relationships between the ANC and the AAM in Britain. Within the SAUF, the ANC’s 
representatives in particular played a crucial role in aiding and legitimising the position of the nascent 
AAM within the international anti-apartheid struggle. The SAUF-AAM alliance was advantageous while 
it lasted, but its collapse allowed the ANC to fill the void as the organisation’s representative liberation 
movement at the expense of the PAC. Those early few months of the exiled liberation struggle were 
crucial in enhancing this relationship, and the SAUF provided a platform for this to happen. The SAUF 
is often regarded as a footnote in the broader narrative of South Africa’s exiled liberation struggle, but 
this short-lived coalition deserves greater recognition than is normally afforded to it.     
Acknowledgments 
I’d like to thank the anonymous peer-reviewers for offering helpful and constructive comments and 
guidance on this article. This work was supported by the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Arts and 
Humanities Small Grants Award.  
Notes 
1 Dadoo, ‘Why the United Front Failed’.  
2 Gurney, ‘A Great Cause’, 123-144; Skinner, ‘Moral Foundations’, 399-416. 
3 Graham, Crisis, 2. 
4 It must be noted that seeking international moral and political support was just one dimension within the 
wider-strategy for liberation employed by the movements. This period saw both the ANC and PAC utilise 
violence in their quest for liberation, a ‘turn’ that was not universally popular among activists creating schisms 
over direction and purpose. However, as the period in exile grew, freedom achieved through a violent 
liberation struggle increasingly came to dominate the political thinking of these movements. 
5 Gurney, ‘A Great Cause’, 133-135. 
6 While the SAUF is regularly mentioned in a range of studies such as Ndlovu, Dubow, Lissoni, Fieldhouse, and 
Skinner, it is a fragmented history that usually only merits several pages at most.  
7 ‘South Africa United Front: Minutes of meeting held in Addis Ababa, 19 June 1960, Hotel Guenet’, Mayibuye 
Archive, University of Western Cape (hereafter UWC), MCH02, Box 1, Item 3.  
8 ‘Record of remarks by Dr Verwoerd, 16th March, 1961’, The National Archives (TNA), London, DO161/110. 
9 UN Security Resolution 134 (1960), ‘Question relating to the situation in the Union of South Africa’. 
10 Lodge, Sharpeville, 169.  
11 Callinicos, Tambo, 253. 
12 ‘Molotsi interview’, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Gerhart, Gail 
Interviews and documents, A2422, Box 1.   
13 Kondlo, Twilight, 68. 
14 Pahad, ‘A proud history of struggle’, 63. 
14
15 The SACP was not formally part of the SAUF, but due to the organisations secretive structure following its 
banning in 1950, it had representatives who held positions in both the ANC and SAIC.  
16 ‘South Africa United Front, Decisions and Resolutions, 19 January 1961’, Mayibuye Archives, UWC, MCH02, 
Box 1, Item 2. 
17 Ridgway, et al., Shooting at the Old Location. 
18 The influence of the Namibian movements to the SAUF was limited, with the vast majority of its campaigns 
almost entirely focusing on South Africa. For the purposes of this article, the campaigns that addressed 
Namibia / South West Africa will not be examined. 
19 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in exile’, 429. 
20 Dadoo, ‘Why the United Front Failed’.  
21 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations on United Front and After, by Judy Coburn’, 11, Liberation Archives, 
University of Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, Folder, 871. 
22 Ibid., 1. 
23 Kondlo, Twilight, 113. 
24 Sisulu, In our lifetime, 179; Lodge, Sharpeville, 197; Kondlo, Twilight, 112-115.  
25 ‘Decisions taken at a meeting of the secretariat of the NEC, 24 October 1961’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, 
MCH02, Box 1, Item 1.  
26 Karis, and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 351; Lissoni, ‘liberation movements in exile’, 92; Lodge, Black 
Politics, 297; Shubin, View From Moscow, 49; Thomas, Diplomacy of Liberation, 35.  
27 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 1-2. 
28 Ndlovu, ‘The ANC in exile’, 429; Mandela, Long Walk, 352; Johns, ‘Obstacles’, 277. 
29 For example, see: ‘Copy of letter dated 18th February, 1961 from T.W. Keeble, Accra to J. Chadwick’, TNA, 
PREM11/3537; ‘Record of a conversation at Admiralty House, November 8th 1960’, TNA, PREM11/3115.  
30 The Times, ‘S. Africa’s place safe in Commonwealth’, 10 March 1961; The Times, ‘Prime Ministers at crucial 
stage’, 13 March 1961. 
31 ‘Minutes of meeting held in Addis Ababa, 19 June 1960, Hotel Guenet’, Mayibuye Archives, UWC, MCH02, 
Box 1, Item 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 5. 
34 ‘Resolution adopted by the Second Conference of Independent African States, 14-26 June 1960, Addis 
Ababa’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 973. 
35 Thörn, Civil Society; Gurney, ‘A Great Cause’; Skinner, Anti-apartheid; Stevens, ‘Strategies’.  
36 ‘Correspondence of Tennyson Makiwane, 1959-60’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 4; 
Gurney, ‘A Great Cause’, 134; Dubow, ‘New Approaches’, 312. 
37 ‘Committee of African Organisations’ papers concerning establishment of Boycott Movement, 1959-60’, 
University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 1. 
38 Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 27.  
39 ‘Letter to Nana Mahomo from Rosalynde Ainslie, 8 August 1960’; ‘Return letter from Nana Mahomo to 
Rosalynde Ainslie, 10 August 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 973. 
40 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 28. 
41 ‘Letter from Rosalynde Ainslie to the SAUF, 21 November 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS 
AAM 973. 
42 ‘Press statement: The situation in South Africa, 6 September 1960’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 2, 
Item 7. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ‘AAM Minutes of executive committee 14 September 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS 
AAM 66.  
45 ‘SAUF Press Statement, 18 November 1960’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 5. 
46 ‘London Reporting to the Offices of the South Africa United Front, Accra/Cairo/New York, 21 November 
1960’, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Oliver Tambo Papers, A2561, 
C4.46. 
47 See Graham, Crisis, chapters 2 & 3. 
48 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 6 May 1960’, TNA, London, CAB/128/34; The Guardian, 
‘Conference in state of quiet pessimism’, 10 May 1960. 
49 Kenny, Verwoerd, 238. 
50 ‘South Africa United Front, Decisions and Resolutions’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 2.  
51 Nana Mohomo interview with CBC, News Magazine, 22 January 1961.  
15
52 Tambo and Make, ‘Statement’, UFH, Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 083, Folder, 0871; The Guardian, ‘Exile 
delegation for the UN’, 17 October 1960. 
53 ‘Minutes 30 December 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 66. 
54 ‘Copy of Memorandum from United Front, 7 December 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS 
AAM 973; ‘Minutes 30 December 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 66. 
55 ‘South Africa United Front, Decisions and Resolutions’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 2. 
56 ‘Extract from Delhi: South Africa and the Commonwealth’, TNA, DO161/110. 
57 The Guardian, ‘Suspend South Africa from the Commonwealth’, 26 Jan 1961; The Observer, ‘S. African 
Petition’, 12 March 1961. 
58 Hyam, ‘Parting’, 157-175; Hyam and Henshaw, Lion, 254-272; Dubow, The Commonwealth, 297-299; Wood, 
‘The roles’, 153-179. 
59 For example see various files in: TNA, DO161/106; TNA, DO161/110; TNA, PREM11/3115; TNA, 
PREM11/3116; TNA, PREM11/3217; TNA, PREM11/3393. 
60 ‘Anti-Apartheid Bulletin, no.2, report of Anti-apartheid conference, 28 January 1961’, University of Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 2205.  
61 Legum, Pan-Africanism, 144-45. 
62 ‘South Africa and Commonwealth, 6 March 1961’, TNA, DO161/110; ‘Africa 1961: South Africa and the 
Commonwealth’ and ‘Views of Commonwealth governments’, TNA, DO161/106; The Times, ‘S. Africa’s place 
safe in Commonwealth’, 10 March 1961. 
63 The Guardian, ‘Expulsion not likely’, 8 March 1961. 
64 Hyam, ‘Parting’, 166-170. 
65 See Nyerere’s various letters to Heads of State before the conference in: TNA, DO161/45; The Observer, 
‘South Africa or us’, 12 March 1961. 
66 ‘Communique issued on 15th March 1961: in Annex II of Final Communique March 17th’, TNA, PREM11/3215. 
67 Dadoo, ‘Forced withdrawal’. 
68 Bernstein, ‘Break with the commonwealth’, 5.  
69 ‘A month of victories’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 2205. 
70 ‘The ides of March’, 2. 
71 ‘South Africa United Front, Newsletter. Press Statement, 16 March 1961’, University of Oxford, Bodleian 
Library, Mss Afr. S 1681, Box 209, File 2, Item 10, ANC documents. 
72 UN Resolution 1598 (XV), Question of race conflict in South Africa, 15 April 1961.  
73 Reddy, ‘The United Nations’, 53.  
74 ‘Anti-apartheid Movement Press Conference, 25 May 1961’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS 
AAM 973. 
75 Dadoo, ‘Why the United Front Failed’.  
76 Lodge, Black Politics, 232. 
77 ‘Decisions taken at a meeting of the Secretariat of the NEC, 24 October 1961’, UWC, Mayibuye Archives, 
MCH02, Box 1, Item 1.  
78 ‘South Africa United Front Press Statement’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 973.  
79 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 7.  
80 Hyam, ‘Parting’, 172. 
81 The Guardian, ‘Dr Verwoerd back to a hero’s welcome’, 21 March 1961. 
82 For a visual representation see: ‘Atlas of Apartheid’s Allies’. 
83 Dubow, ‘Macmillan’, 1110.  
84 ‘Conclusions of a meeting of the cabinet, 16 March 1961’, TNA, London, CAB/128/35/13; ‘Conclusions of a 
meeting of the cabinet, 21 March 1961’, TNA, London, CAB/128/35/15. 
85 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 13.  
86 Sisulu, In our lifetime, 179. 
87 Kondlo, Twilight, 114-115; Lodge, Sharpeville, 197.  
88 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 11. 
89 ‘Activities of the South African United Front’, TNA, FCO141/17899. 
90 Ibid.  
91 ‘Decisions taken at a meeting of the Secretariat of the NEC, 24 October 1961’, Mayibuye Archives, UWC, 
MCH02, Box 1, Item 1. 
92 Kondlo, Twilight, 115. 
16
93 ‘Notes of meeting to discuss OAU Liberation Committee resolution calling for a united front with PAC’, 
Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Oliver Tambo Papers, A5261, C4.46, 
South African Front / South African United Front; Ibid., The Call for Unity and a United Front. 
94 Klein, ‘Publicising’, 395. 
95 Williams, Politics of Race’, 109; Gurney, ‘1970s’, 472. 
96 Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 60. 
97 Lodge, Sharpeville, 250; Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 284. 
References 
Atlas of Apartheid Allies. Accessed 10 January, 2018. http://www.opensecrets.org.za/downloads/02_An%
20Atlas%20of%20Apartheid%20Allies.pdf
Bernstein, Lionel. ‘SA’s break with the commonwealth’, Fighting Talk, 15, no. 3 (1961): 4-5. (Available through 
Digital Innovation South Africa; accessed December 9, 2017. http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/ Callinicos, Luli. Oliver 
Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains. Cape Town: David Philip, 2004. 
Dadoo, Yusuf. ‘Why the United Front Failed: Disruptive Role of the PAC’, New Age, March 29 1962. Accessed 
January 6, 2018. http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/history/dadoo-a.html" \l "5e  
Dadoo, Yusuf. ‘Forced withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth – historic step forward in struggle 
against apartheid’. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/history/dadoo-
a.html" \l "5d
Dubow, Saul. ‘Macmillan, Verwoerd, and the 1960 ‘wind of change’ speech’, The Historical Journal, 54, no. 4 
(2011): 1087-1114.  
Dubow, Saul. ‘The Commonwealth and South Africa: From Smuts to Mandela’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 45, no. 2 (2017), 284-314. 
Dubow, Saul. ‘New approaches to High Apartheid and Anti-Apartheid’, South African Historical Journal, 69, no. 
2 (2017), 304-329. 
Ellis, Stephen. External Mission: The ANC in exile, 1960-1990. London: Hurst, 2012. 
Fieldhouse, Roger. Anti-apartheid: A History of the Movement in Britain. A study in pressure group politics. 
London: The Merlin Press Limited, 2005.  
Graham, Matthew. The Crisis of South African Foreign Policy and the ANC: Diplomacy, Leadership and the Role 
of the African National Congress. London: I.B. Tauris, 2016. 
Graham, Matthew. ‘The ANC and the ‘Myth’ of Liberation Solidarity: ‘Othering’ in Post-apartheid South(ern) 
Africa’, Africa Insight , 44, no. 1 (2014), 176-190. 
Gurney, Christabel. ‘A Great Cause’: The origins of the Anti-apartheid Movement, June 1959-1960’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 26, no. 1 (2000), 123-144. 
Gurney, Christabel. ‘The 1970s: The Anti-Apartheid Movement's Difficult Decade’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 35, no.2 (2009), 471-487. 
Hyam, Ronald. ‘The parting of the ways: Britain and South Africa’s departure from the commonwealth, 1951-
1961’, The journal of imperial and commonwealth history, 26, no. 2 (1998): 157-175. 
Hyam, Ronald and Henshaw, Peter. The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Johns, Sheridan. ‘Obstacles to guerrilla warfare: a South African case study’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 11, no. 2 (1973): 267-303. 
Karis, Thomas and Gail Gerhart. From Protest to challenge: Volume 3, Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964. 
Stanford:  Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 
Kenny, Henry. Verwoerd: Architect of apartheid. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2016.  
Klein, Genevieve, ‘Publicising the African National Congress: The Anti-Apartheid News’, South African History 
Journal, 63, no. 3 (2011), 394-413. 
Kondlo, Kwandiwe. In the twilight of the revolution: The Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa), 1959-
1994. Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 2010. 
Lissoni, Arianna. ‘The South African liberation movements in exile, c. 1945-1970’. PhD dissertation, SOAS, 
2008. 
Legum, Colin. Pan-Africanism: a short political guide. London: Pall Mall, 1965. 
Lodge, Tom. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. London: Longman Higher Education, 1983. 
Lodge, Tom. Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
17
Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom. London: Abacus, 1995. 
Mohomo, Nana interview with CBC, News Magazine, 22 January 1961. Accessed 9 January 2018. http://
www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/preview-of-1961-commonwealth-prime-ministers-conference" }  
Ndlovu, Sifiso. ‘The ANC in exile, 1960-1970’, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1, 
1960-1970, 411-478. Cape Town: Struik Publishers, 2004. 
Pahad, Essop. ‘A proud history of struggle’, The African Communist, 78, no 3 (1979): 63.   
Reddy, Enuga. ‘The United Nations and the struggle for Liberation in South Africa’, in SADET, Road to 
Democracy, Volume 3, 41-139. Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008.  
Ridgway, Dawn, Milly Jafta, Nicky Kautja, Magda Oliphant, and Shipingana Kapofi. An Investigation of the 
Shooting at the Old Location on 10 December 1959. Windhoek: University of Namibia, 1991. 
Skinner, Rob. ‘The moral foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1946-1960’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 35, no. 2 (2009), 399-416. 
Skinner, Rob. The foundations of anti-apartheid. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Shubin, Vladimir. The ANC: a View From Moscow. Cape Town: Jacana, 1999. 
Sisulu, Elinor. Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In our lifetime. London: Abacus, 2003.  
Stevens, Simon. ‘Strategies of Struggle: Boycotts, sanctions, and the war against apartheid, 1946-1978’ (PhD 
thesis, Columbia University, 2015). 
Thörn, Håkan. Anti-apartheid and the emergence of a global civil society. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006. 
‘The ides of March’, Contact, 4, no. 6 (March 1961): 2. (Available through Digital Innovation South Africa; 
accessed January 17, 2015. http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/) 
Thomas, Scott. The Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960. London: I.B. Tauris, 
1996.  
UN Security Resolution 134 (1960). ‘Question relating to the situation in the Union of South Africa’. Accessed 
26 January 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/134%281960%29 
UN Resolution 1598 (XV) (1961). Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of 
apartheid of the government of the Union of South Africa. Accessed 18 January 2015. 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/198/13/IMG/NR019813.pdf?OpenElement 
Williams, Elizabeth. The politics of race in Britain and South Africa: Black British solidarity and the anti-
apartheid struggle. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. 
Wood, Richard. ‘The roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd in the withdrawal of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 6, 1/2, (1987) 153-179. 
98 Graham, Crisis, 12-13. 
99 Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 60. 
100 ‘Boycott movement minutes, 30 April Recall Conference 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS 
AAM 2. 
101 Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 32-35. 
102 ‘Discussion document on the future of the anti-apartheid movement, 3 May 1961’, University of Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, MSS AAM45. 
103 Skinner, Anti-apartheid, 181; Williams, Politics of race, 33. 
104 Skinner, Anti-apartheid, 109. 
105 Ellis, Mission, 308-310; Graham, ‘Solidarity’. 
18
